ICANN’s Shifting Sands: An Era of Diminished Authority and Rising Domain Costs

The past four years have marked a significant turning point for the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), an organization critical to the stable and secure operation of the internet. Once seen as a guardian of the public interest in domain name management, ICANN appears to have undergone a notable weakening of its resolve and authority. As Göran Marby approaches his fourth anniversary as CEO, the question of his legacy, and indeed the future trajectory of the institution he leads, hangs in the balance.

The Leadership of Göran Marby: A Legacy Under Scrutiny

When the history of domain name governance is written, Göran Marby’s tenure as ICANN CEO, particularly the period between 2019 and 2020, will likely be remembered for a series of decisions that dramatically reshaped the economics of the domain name industry. These actions, largely driven by the organization’s revised stance on price controls, have led many to question whether ICANN is still adequately serving its foundational mission to coordinate the global internet’s unique identifiers in the public interest. Critics argue that these decisions have paved the way for significantly increased domain name prices, directly impacting businesses and individuals reliant on a stable and affordable internet infrastructure.

The Erosion of Price Controls: A Defining Policy Shift

One of the most contentious episodes defining this era was ICANN’s decision to lift price caps on the .org domain. For years, the .org registry, managed by Public Interest Registry (PIR), operated under a framework designed to protect the non-profit and public interest organizations that predominantly use it. The removal of these crucial price controls opened the door for PIR’s sale to Ethos Capital, a private equity firm. This move triggered widespread alarm within the internet community, sparking fears that a critical piece of internet infrastructure would be exploited for profit, potentially leading to exorbitant price hikes and reduced accessibility for non-profits and NGOs. Although the sale to Ethos Capital was ultimately blocked by ICANN following immense public pressure, the underlying policy decision to remove price caps on .org remained in place, establishing a dangerous precedent and signaling a shift away from user protection.

The Verisign Agreement: A Precedent for Unchecked Increases

Concurrently with the .org controversy, ICANN also renegotiated its agreement with Verisign, the operator of the highly critical .com domain. This new contract, signed amidst public outcry, included a provision allowing Verisign to implement annual price increases. Furthermore, ICANN accepted a $20 million payment from Verisign, ostensibly to fill a budget hole. This financial exchange, coupled with the new pricing flexibility granted to a powerful registry, was seen by many as a clear indication of ICANN prioritizing financial stability and the interests of large registries over its historical role in maintaining reasonable domain pricing for the broader internet community. The decision effectively removed a key safeguard that had historically protected .com registrants from unchecked price escalations, inviting speculation about the long-term affordability and accessibility of the internet’s most popular top-level domain.

The Multistakeholder Model Under Strain: Public Comment and Transparency

At its core, ICANN operates on a multistakeholder model, theoretically ensuring that decisions are made with input from diverse global communities, including governments, businesses, technical experts, and civil society. A vital component of this model is the public comment period, intended to gather broad feedback on proposed policies. However, during this period of significant policy shifts, many observers felt that public comment periods were treated as mere formalities rather than genuine opportunities for meaningful input. Despite giving lip service to the importance of community engagement, the decisions regarding .org and .com were perceived by many as having been pushed through with little regard for the overwhelming concerns raised by the public. This perceived disregard for community sentiment has not only eroded trust but has also cast a shadow over the integrity and effectiveness of ICANN’s unique governance model, suggesting a fundamental disconnect between the organization’s actions and the expectations of its stakeholders.

A ‘Path of Least Resistance’: Leadership, Board, and Organizational Weakness

The criticisms leveled against ICANN’s recent decisions often converge on the idea that the organization, under Marby’s leadership and with the board’s acquiescence, has opted for “the path of least resistance.” Terms like “ineffectual” or “pushover” have been used to describe the leadership’s approach. This strategy appears to prioritize avoiding potential lawsuits and placating powerful, well-funded companies that contribute significantly to the non-profit’s coffers. The internal dynamics behind these choices remain largely opaque; however, one must ponder whether ICANN is simply trying to navigate a complex landscape of competing interests by making the most expedient, rather than necessarily the most principled, decisions. Is the blame solely on Göran Marby, or is it also indicative of a broader problem within a board that, too, might be seeking to avoid confrontation and criticism?

The “ICANN Is Not a Price Regulator” Doctrine: A Historical Revision

A cornerstone of ICANN’s recent justification for its changed stance on price controls is the assertion that “ICANN is not a price regulator.” This statement, which has become a reflexive refrain from ICANN management, has drawn considerable scrutiny from the community, including prominent figures like Zak Muscovitch, a Canadian domain name attorney. In a compelling letter (pdf) to ICANN’s board, Muscovitch eloquently dismantled this argument, highlighting its self-serving nature and lack of historical grounding. He pointed out that this assertion has never been subject to a multistakeholder policy development process, which is the standard for significant policy shifts within ICANN. Furthermore, as Muscovitch argued, and as historical records confirm, ICANN has, since its inception, played an active role in setting and influencing prices for contracted parties. To claim otherwise is, in his words, a “red herring,” implying that the organization is attempting to abdicate responsibility through definitional acrobatics. This revisionist stance effectively redefines ICANN’s historical role and raises serious questions about its commitment to its founding principles and accountability to the global internet community.

The Self-Inflicted Wound: A Shift Without Community Mandate

The decision to abandon its role in controlling prices is not only a historical revision but also a significant departure from past practices. It is crucial to note that this shift represents:

1. A Recent Change: While ICANN considered loosening price controls during contract renewals in 2006, it ultimately decided against it after robust community feedback and significant public resistance. This demonstrates a past willingness to heed community concerns.
2. An Organizational Decision: Unlike many policies developed through bottom-up processes, this fundamental change was largely an internal organizational decision, not one arising from or endorsed by the broader multistakeholder community. This top-down approach starkly contrasts with ICANN’s professed commitment to consensus-driven policy making.

After decades of maintaining a supervisory role over the prices of legacy top-level domains, ICANN has, quite abruptly, washed its hands of this crucial responsibility. This retreat from its historical mandate appears to be driven by the aforementioned “path of least resistance” – a strategy designed to avoid difficult negotiations and potential legal challenges from powerful registry operators. By deferring to outside parties or the registries themselves, ICANN effectively sidesteps complex decisions that require balancing commercial interests with the public good.

The Peril of Irrelevance: What’s Next for ICANN and Internet Governance?

The consequences of ICANN’s perceived weakening extend far beyond specific pricing debates. Organizations that consistently avoid making tough decisions, especially those critical to their core mission, inevitably begin to degrade their own authority and relevance. By becoming an organization perceived as “spineless” or overly susceptible to commercial pressures, ICANN risks being sidelined or made irrelevant in the broader landscape of internet governance. If ICANN abdicates its responsibility to ensure fair and equitable access to domain names, other entities, perhaps less accountable or transparent, may step in to fill the void. This could lead to a fragmented and less stable internet, undermining the very principles of open, secure, and globally accessible connectivity that ICANN was established to uphold. The degradation of ICANN’s role could have profound long-term ramifications for the internet’s stability, security, and open nature. It’s not merely a matter of domain name costs; it’s about the future of a critical global resource. The potential for such an outcome is, unequivocally, a great shame for an institution that once held such promise as a model for global, multistakeholder governance.