Emphasizes value of short domains and risks of UDRP abuse — Ks.com case
Panelist explains fraudulent scheme by Complainant to hijack valuable two-letter domain name through UDRP.
A person filed a UDRP complaint stating that a domain name was fraudulently stolen from them. But the panelist reviewing the case determined it was the Complainant who was committing fraud.
The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) case for KS.com shows how UDRP could potentially be used fraudulently.
The complainant, purporting to be “Knowledge Systems, Inc.,” filed the case against longtime registrant Robert Akscyn, a computer scientist who was a co-developer of early hypertext and artificial intelligence programs at Carnegie Mellon University in Pennsylvania and commercialized one of these through a Pennsylvania corporation named Knowledge Systems Incorporated, formed in 1985.
Panelist W. Scott Blackmer determined the Complainant was undertaking an elaborate ruse to steal the valuable domain name. He wrote (pdf):
The Complainant claims to be “Knowledge Systems, Inc.”, an INC. incorporated in the United Kingdom on October 18, 1983 with a registered office address in the State of California, United States. The Complainant characterizes itself as a “globally recognized leader in the field of software development and consultancy, specializing in the predictive analytics for pore pressure in rock formations”, headquartered in Houston, Texas. The Complaint attaches a copy of the LinkedIn account page for “Knowledge Systems, Inc.”, which displays little information other than identifying the firm with the “oil and gas” industry, listing a “headquarters” address in Houston, claiming “51-200 employees”, and identifying four “associated members”. These include an “owner” named John Foster in the State of West Virginia who has never posted anything to date on LinkedIn. A red figurative logo appears on the LinkedIn page along with a photo of ships and the tagline, “More Knowledge. Fewer Surprises”. The initials “KS” do not appear on the page.
The Complainant’s assertions cannot be taken at face value. The Complainant’s representative names himself as Allan Piliko, without identifying his office or role. The email address he used in corresponding with the Registrar and with the Center is composed of the Respondent’s name at a Russian email service provider. Although the Complainant is ostensibly a United Kingdom “Inc.”, no entity called “Knowledge Systems Inc.” is listed on the United Kingdom’s official Firms House database. The Complainant’s name and address as shown in the Complaint correspond with those of a California corporation listed as “suspended” and “inactive” since August 1985 in the online database of the California Secretary of State. The Response attaches evidence that this firm could not be contacted by the United States Postal Service at the given address in March 2025, when these proceedings commenced. Similarly, the “Knowledge Systems, Inc.” with a mailing address in Houston, Texas has been “inactive” since 1985 and no longer has a right to transact business in Texas, as stated by the online database of the Texas Comptroller. The Respondent shows that the Texas firm featured in the LinkedIn page cited by the Complainant was purchased in 2008 by a division of Halliburton.
The Complainant claims to own United States Trademark Registration Number 1485667 (registered on April 19, 1988) for the word mark KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS. In fact, this registration was granted to the Respondent Knowledge Systems Incorporated, the Pennsylvania corporation with a principal address in Export, Pennsylvania, of which the Respondent Robert Akscyn was and is president. The Complainant does not demonstrate any relationship with this corporation, and the Respondent denies any association with the Complainant….
and later:
The Complaint attaches an email in which the Respondent supposedly replied to the Complainant on January 25, 2025, with the subject line “Get Back Your Domain KS.com”, offering “the opportunity to reclaim it” for USD 3 million and stating, “Failure to do so may result in the public disclosure of certain sensitive information”. That reply from the Respondent is signed by “Roberto” rather than “Robert” Akscyn. The Respondent denies sending this email and observes that it is a typed document not a photocopy of a Gmail (which can be readily observed by comparing it with actual Gmail emails). It is also dated a month ahead of the Complainant claims that the Respondent “hijacked” the disputed domain name. The Panel concludes that this piece of evidence submitted with the Complaint is likely fraudulent.
Blackmer noted, “This proceeding demonstrates once again that two-letter .com domain names are inherently valuable and attract fraudsters as well as domain speculators.”
Fortunately, Blackmer was on the case. And fortunately, the domain registrant responded.
But what would have happened if the registrant hadn’t responded? Would all panelists have dug a bit deeper?
There is no verification of complainants’ identities in UDRP. It’s possible people have filed cases purporting to be someone they are not to steal valuable domains through UDRP.
